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This paper shows the impact that investment in infrastructure may have on the efficiency 
of agricultural products markets.  Using daily price series for the most important 
agricultural crop in Peru (potato), in 10 cities from 1995 to 2001, we show that there is 
enough evidence to conclude that agricultural markets are spatially integrated.  However 
we also show that there is short term disequilibria that affect the efficiency with which 
price information is transmitted across markets. A Threshold Cointegration Model is 
used to asses the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium, the presence of 
transaction costs and the probabilities of successful and failed arbitrage between spatially 
distributed markets.  As was expected, the paper shows that distance and geographic 
differences are important factors affecting spatial integration and efficiency between 
markets.  However, other elements susceptible of government intervention, such as 
availability of information (access to local media and telecommunications facilities), 
road density or access to wholesale markets, are key factors for the reduction of 
transaction costs and the improvement of spatial integration between markets. 
 
JEL: R12, D23, H54, Q11, Q13 
 
1. Introduction   
 
The Enke-Samuelson model Roehmer (1995) which is a generalization of an 
arbitrage model, has been widely used to explain price differences between spatially 
separated markets.  This model predicts that if transportation costs decrease, price 
differences and dispersion between cities reduces while traded volumes increase.   
Similarly, if transaction costs between two or more cities increase, then price differences 
increase and correlation decreases rapidly.  Nevertheless, the application of this model to 
agricultural markets has been constrained by the lack of information about this type of 
costs. In view of the difficulty of estimating transaction costs, many specialized studies 
have used a modified definition of integration (analyzing the variations on price 
differentials).  Following this approach, two markets are said to be integrated if price 
variations observed in one market are generated by variations in the other one.  If these 
markets are geographically separated, these markets can be defined as spatially 
integrated. 
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Many studies have shown that domestic agriculture markets have some degree of 
spatial integration. The degree of market integration has been measured through various 
methodologies, from the usage of correlation analysis to the use of autoregressive 
models, causality tests or cointegration techniques
2. After reviewing the more recent 
literature on this topic, this chapter seeks to measure market integration in Peruvian 
agriculture using as a case study the Peruvian potato market. Further, after estimating the 
speed of adjustment of interrelated markets facing an external shock, the chapter 
proceeds and shows the impact of infrastructure investment on agricultural market 
integration.  Using daily price series of one of the most important crops in Peru – potato- 
collected from 10 cities during the period January 1995 through May 2001, these 
chapters presents some evidence supporting the hypothesis of long-run spatial 
integration of Peruvian agricultural markets.  Nevertheless, there exist transitory 
disequilibria that affect the efficiency in the transmission of information across those 
markets. An error correction model is used to estimate causality relations between 
spatially distributed markets as well as their speed of adjustment towards the 
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equilibrium.  Distance between markets as well as geographical differences restrict and 
distort spatial integration and efficiency between markets.  However, other elements 
susceptible of government intervention, such as telecommunication facilities, road 
density or access to wholesale markets, are also important to improve efficiency and 
integration between markets.  
The chapter is divided into five major sections. The second section presents a 
brief literature review on agricultural market integration showing how this literature has 
deal with the presence of transaction costs and potentially asymmetric price behavior. 
The third section presents a simple Threshold Cointegration Model that will be used to 
asses the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium, the presence of transaction costs 
and the probabilities of successful and failed arbitrage between spatially distributed 
markets. Section four described the basic characteristics of the potato market in Peru, 
which is used here as a case study to evaluate spatial market integration in Peruvian 
Agriculture. After calculating the speed of adjustment of spatially distributed potato 
markets, we asses the importance of infrastructure in the reduction of transaction costs 
and the improvement of spatial integration between potato markets in Peru. Finally, 
section five summarizes the results and discusses some new lines of research that can be 
pursued. 
 
2.  Agricultural market integration and arbitrage relations: a brief literature 
review 
 
The specialized literature has used alternative ways to define and measure the 
spatial integration of markets.  On the one hand, it has been established that a set of 
markets is integrated if there are enough agents who, through arbitrage, act in such a way 
that prices reflect all the available information, without the presence of systematical 
extraordinary profits in any of those markets. Alternatively, the degree of integration has 
been identified as the difference between market prices.  From this view, a significant 
difference of prices between two markets would reveal a low degree of integration   3
(probably due to the existence of significant arbitrage costs), while a small difference 
would be a sign of a higher degree of integration. 
Following Barrett and Li (2000), from a more formal approach, integration may 
be defined as tradability or contestability between markets.  This would imply the 
transfer of Walrasian demand  excess for goods from one market to the other, the 
transmission of shocks in prices between markets, or both.  From this approach, an actual 
physical transfer of goods does not need to be observed to assure that markets are 
spatially integrated. 
According to Sexton, et al. (1991) and Lutz, et al. (1995), two factors may 
explain the lack of spatial integration of markets.  First, physical barriers for trading, 
incomplete information, risk adverse agents, among others, may be obstacles for an 
efficient arbitrage. Second, imperfect competition structures in the markets under 
analysis may constitute barriers to entry that would prevent price arbitrage.  Moreover, if 
the transaction costs were higher than price differentials between localities, the arbitrage 
process between regions would be blocked causing markets segmentation. 
In absence of simultaneous information about prices and trade flows, the 
correlation analysis of prices between different pairs of regions has been traditionally 
used as the appropriate framework to analyze spatial integration of markets [Fafchamps 
and Gavian (1996); Alexander and Wyeth (1994)].  Within this framework, a higher 
(lower) correlation is understood as a higher (lower) degree of spatial integration, 
whereas the sign of the correlation is taken as indicator of direction of the effects.  A 
criticism this approach has received is that within this framework it is impossible to 
establish which region, among those being analyzed, is the main central market (if there 
exists one).  On the other hand, if the impact of changes in prices over the different 
regions were not contemporaneous but lagged, the correlation analysis would indicate a 
low degree of integration even if there is actually market integration although it is not 
instantaneous
3.   
Considering these limitations, several efforts have been made to introduce a 
dynamic framework, with the purpose of verifying the existence of integration in the 
short run and long run.  Ravallion (1986) developed the distributed lags model that 
incorporates a dynamic component
4.  His proposal consists on evaluating separately 
spatial market integration allowing for long run integration as well as short run 
integration (that is, allowing for a lags structure that accounts for integration delay).  In 
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where, Pi (i = 1...N) represents the price in each local market, R is the central market 
price, Xi represents other exogenous variables that influence these markets’ dynamics, 
and  ) , ( t t ν ε  are random error terms.  Estimating and contrasting the parameters allow 
testing three important hypotheses: (1) spatial market segmentation: there is no influence 
of one particular market over the others [bi0 = bi1 = 0], (2) long run integration: despite 
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delays in the impact over other markets, full transmission is finally achieved [ai + bi0 + bi1 
= 1], and (3) short run integration: the adjustment of prices to shocks is instantaneous [bi 
= 0, bi1 = ai 0 = 0].  Additionally, we must consider that this model assumes a specific 
structure of integration relationship.  It imposes, a priori, a restriction according to 
which there exists a central market; that is, a market that behaves as an articulating axis 
around which there are peripheral or satellite markets.    
Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) have indicated the main limitations of the radial 
model.  First, the assumption of a central dominant market (i.e., the assumption that any 
link between cities is necessarily established through a central market) might not be an 
accurate way to model the dynamics of spatial integration between markets.  Even in the 
case a central market actually exists, it is preferable testing the hypothesis of existence 
rather than imposing it a priori.   
Subsequently, the radial model has been extended by using the vector 
autoregressive (VAR) technique, allowing for testing the existence of a central market.  
Despite this improvement, two problems become apparent.  First, price series are 
typically non-stationary, so it is possible that spurious correlations arise. Second, spatial 
integration between agricultural markets has been studied from a one-way directional 
perspective, that is, the verification of the radial model hypothesis has been done by 
analyzing market pairs, assuming within each pair case the existence of a central market. 
In the first case, the cointegration analysis enhances the study of long run 
behavior of the series, even when these are non-stationary.  However, little literature on 
the second problem has been developed until now.  Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) as 
well as Gil and Sanjuan (2001), use the multivariate cointegration methodology to solve 
the second problem. In this sense, testing the hypothesis established by Ravallion’s 
model is still the aim, but now within a framework where no a priori restriction is 
imposed.  In the following section we present briefly the links between multivariate 
cointegration analysis and spatial integration of markets.  
The first studies that introduced the cointegration techniques into the study of 
market integration, such as Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) and Badiane and Shively 
(1996), assumed the existence of central agricultural markets as well as symmetric and 
“smooth” price responses.  Under these assumptions, a shock in the central market may 
cause the same answer in all peripheral markets, independently of whether there is an 
increase or a decrease in prices, and independently of the magnitude of the shock. 
Multivariate cointegration studies, as for example those carried out by Alexander 
and Alexander and Wyeth (1994), Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) and Gil and Sanjuan 
(2001), expanded this type of analysis to a multimarket context, assuming the existence 
of a common trend that moves prices of regional markets towards their long run 
equilibrium levels after facing an exogenous shock.  Nevertheless, this mechanism may 
not work in all periods if there are factors (as the arbitrage costs or information failures, 
for example) that hinder the adjustment mechanism. In such cases, only when deviations 
from equilibrium surpass a critical threshold, the profits due to adjustment exceed the 
costs, so the economic agents react to the shock and, consequently, the system returns to 
the equilibrium level.  On the other hand, all these studies also assume that prices 
respond to exogenous shocks in a symmetric way and that transaction costs do not 
generate either asymmetries or discontinuities in such response.  However, certain 
characteristics particular to agricultural product markets may in fact generate 
discontinuities or asymmetries in the responses of prices to shocks, reducing the 
robustness of these results.   5
 
2.1  Discontinuity and asymmetry in the price mechanisms of adjustment in 
regional agricultural markets 
In the absence of exit and entry barriers for traders, the degree of arbitrage and 
integration will depend on both, prices differential and transaction costs (Abdulai (2000). 
However, some characteristics of the agricultural production, commercialization, and 
consumption, such as inappropriate transportation infrastructure, entry barriers and 
information failures, may turn the arbitrage process into a less smooth process than 
assumed by traditional models of market integration. 
A source of asymmetry in the prices response to shocks that is commonly 
mentioned is the market power Scherer and Ross (1990).  For example, the oligopolistic 
intermediaries in an agricultural market may react collusively in a faster way to shocks 
reducing their profit margins than they would react to shocks that increase them, 
generating as a result asymmetries in the transmission of those shocks to other segments 
of the market.  Because of this, an increase in the central market prices would be spread 
to the regional markets in a faster way than would a decrease in such prices. 
On the other hand, the role of inventory accumulation as a source of 
discontinuities in the adjustment of prices between markets has been documented 
Blinder (1982).  According to this argument, variations in prices send signals to 
inventory holders that lead them to accumulate or reduce stocks.  The expected increase 
in the dominant market’s price in the next periods constitutes an incentive for traders to 
increase inventory holdings, thus buying big quantities of a certain agricultural product 
in the present.  But the increase in local market stocks pushes prices down, so the actual 
increase is not as high as originally expected.  If, on the other hand, it was expected that 
the dominant market prices decrease, there would be an incentive for traders to reduce 
their inventory stocks, response that would moderate the magnitude of the prices fall in 
the next periods. Under the argument of inventory holdings, regional market prices 
would not fully adjust to changes in the dominant market prices.  
Other argument that explains the presence of discontinuous or asymmetric price 
responses is the existence of menu costs, understood as those costs that result from the 
repricing and information process that consumers face in the presence of exogenous 
variations Mankiw and Ball (1994).  If variations in the costs of the agricultural product 
were perceived by the agents as temporary, the menu costs might constitute an incentive 
not to adjust prices even when a decrease in the product costs has actually occurred. 
Finally, we should mention that the presence of search costs on imperfect 
regional agricultural markets has also been quoted by many researchers as a source of 
asymmetry or discontinuities in the prices adjustment process that occurs as response to 
exogenous shocks Blinder, et al. (1998).  In many regions, some firms can exercise local 
market power, due to the absence of other firms located in spatial proximity that could 
compete with them.  The consumers that face these dominant firms face high search 
costs to get all the information about prices offered by other firms.  Under these 
conditions, dominant firms may raise their prices quickly when the dominant market’s 
prices increase, whereas they could reduce them little or nothing when prices in the 
central market decrease. 
For Baulch (1997), there are three factors that affect the degree of market 
integration and generate discontinuities in the price responses to exogenous shocks.  The 
first one is the presence of high transaction costs relative to the price differential between   6
two regions that determines the existence of autarkic markets.  The second factor is the 
presence of barriers to entry, risk aversion and information failures.  Finally, the 
existence of imperfect competition in relevant segments of the markets may cause high 
price differentials between markets that cannot be attributed to the transaction costs. 
 
2.2  Alternative frameworks for the analysis of market integration in the 
presence of transaction costs  
Taking into consideration the possible sources of discontinuity and asymmetry in 
the responses of agricultural market prices, researchers have used alternative frameworks 
to carry out studies about spatial integration of agricultural markets that introduce 
transaction costs as elements that affect arbitrage relations between different regions.  As 
we will discuss later, the different techniques relate to concepts implicit in the dynamic 
model proposed by Ravallion (1986), reconsidered in terms of the cointegration method 
and error correction model [Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994); Palaskas and Harriss-
White (1993)], as well as with notions from the parity-bounds model formulated by 
Sexton, et al. (1993) and Baulch (1997).  A similarity between all of these models is that 
they study arbitrage relations between two regions by using, mainly, nominal price series 
of a particular product. 
The analysis framework that almost all of these research works have used is the 
law of one price adjusted by transaction costs, described as follows.  Cijt is the 
transaction cost of trading an agricultural product from the market i to j and Pit is the 
price of the agricultural product in the market i.  The efficient spatial arbitrage requires 
that no extraordinary profits could be generated by trading between regions i and j.  In 
other words, it is necessary that the law of one price, adjusted by transaction costs, is 
fulfilled.  The law is described in the following expression: 
                                    ijt jt it C P P ≤ − | |                                                     (2) 
Under efficient arbitrage, null trade flows imply equation (2) holds with equality 
(binds). Also, the relation might determine bilateral trade flows from i to j or from j to i, 
depending on the market conditions in each city. When (2) holds with equality (binds), 
the prices are said to be in the parity threshold, whereas when the margin is bigger than 
the threshold, extraordinary profits from trade might be generated.  A strict inequality in 
(2) would require non-null trade flows.  Specialized literature involves different 
approaches to modeling arbitrage relations between two regions by using (2), 
furthermore, such approaches allow for estimations of transaction costs. In first place, 
linear models stand out
5.  This formulation seeks to explain linearly the price formation 
in two cities, defining (only) one market equilibrium.  The basic equation of the model 
is: 
                                t t t P time C P µ β α + + + = 2 12 1 * *                                (3) 
where “time” is a linear trend and  t µ  is a random error term.  With prices measured in 
levels, the intercept C12 in the equation (3) shows the fixed transaction cost and the beta 
coefficient measures the proportional mark-up or the cost of trading between markets 1 
and 2.  Although equation (2) is informative, it is still incomplete since it does not 
introduce dynamic aspects on its specification.  Another problem, of methodological 
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nature, is the presence of unit roots in the price series, which causes spurious estimations 
of the equation (3) if the error term  t µ  is non-stationary. 
As Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) sustain, if (2) was valid and  t µ  was 
stationary, then we would say that both spatially separated markets are integrated and the 
expression (3) would be a cointegrating equation, which establishes the existence of a 
long run relation between price series. Therefore, the weak form of the spatial integration 
condition is defined. This condition establishes that if (2) was valid, the spatial 
integration might occur in the long run with temporary short run deviations
6.  It is worth 
to note that, in order to assure that the model is consistent with an efficient arbitrage 
situation, this framework is implicitly assuming that trade between the two cities is 
continuous and that there is no reversion in the direction that trade flows take.  In this 
context, the fixed arbitrage cost is estimated independently of the patterns and continuity 
of trade.  Nevertheless, empirically, only in few cases condition (2) is satisfied, so the 
model excludes situations in which no profitable trade carries on as well as those in 
which market conditions in different regions vary enough so as to generate reversions in 
the trade flows. In this sense, the existence of cointegration between price series is not 
enough to determine the existence of efficient arbitrage, and it will be necessary, in order 
to evaluate whether market relations are actually efficient, to compare transaction costs 
in (3) with observed costs or any other information about markets. 
In second place, an alternative framework to study the integration relations 
between markets is the Parity Bounds Model
7 that assumes that transaction costs have a 
constant mean C12t and a random component Vct which is normally distributed with zero 
mean and constant variance. These costs constitute thresholds for a band of possible 
equilibrium, with respect to which the prices from both markets can be situated.  The 
price differential  | | 2 1 t t P P − , in this context, may define two possible regimes.  If this 
differential is inside the band, it means ct t t t v C P P ' | | 12 2 1 − = − , an efficient arbitrage 
takes place where there is trade without the presence of extraordinary profits.  On the 
other hand, if the differential is outside the band, it means ct t t t v C P P
0
12 2 1 | | − = − , little 
trade takes place and extraordinary profits come out to be exploited through arbitrage.  In 
this setting, arbitrage failures or reversions of trade flows may occur. 
If  ct v' and 
0
ct v  were assumed to be independently distributed it is easy to 
formulate the likelihood function for the two regimes and, by maximizing this function, 
we could estimate the probability of successful or failed arbitrage, as well as the 
transaction costs.  However, this model has some limitations.  First, the model 
identification depends on the assumptions about the distribution of  ct v' and 
0
ct v  
(normality is usually assumed).  On the other hand, the assumption of independence of 
the error terms does not seem to be reasonable since it would imply that all the 
information contained in the errors in one period would be completely lost in the future 
and, hence, it would not allow for the existence of a mechanism of adjustment that 
corrects the distortions in the arbitrage process.  Other limitation of the Parity Bounds 
Model is that it does not include the dynamic component in the transaction costs analysis 
and, as a consequence, it does not allow us to infer anything about the speed of the price 
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adjustment when there exists profitable trade opportunities (in other words, when the 
price differential is above the equilibrium band).  Finally, to get conclusive results it is 
necessary to have additional information about trade flows and arbitrage costs between 
cities in order to carry out comparisons with the probabilities of occurrence of the 
possible regimes and with the estimated transaction costs.  
In the presence of the limitations of the described analysis frameworks, the 
challenge, hence, is to develop a dynamic model that considers the presence of 
transaction costs, discontinuity and reversion in the trade patterns (or direction), and also 
that allows to make inference about the speed of price adjustment to equilibrium levels.  
In that sense, the bivariate cointegration techniques with threshold as well as the Band-
TAR models constitute an analysis framework to overcome some of the limitations 
mentioned earlier.  In this document, we use this type of approach with the purpose of 
analyzing market integration in presence of transaction costs for the Peruvian potato 
market case.  The formal presentation of the technical details of the model will be 
described in the third section. 
 
2.3  Structural determinants of the integration relations and the arbitrage costs 
The last topic to discuss in this section is the structural determinants of the spatial 
integration of markets.  Even though literature shows a special emphasis on the study of 
the existence of some type of market integration, the identification of the structural 
determinants of such integration has not received much attention.  The identification of 
these factors is needed for the implementation of investment policies oriented to develop 
agricultural markets.  Following this concern, the first step in the analysis consists on 
identifying an indicator of market integration. Literature has pointed out some indicators: 
a) the simple correlation coefficients between city pairs, b) the cointegration coefficients 
(which capture the existence of a long run linear relation between prices), and c) the 
parameters representing the speed of adjustment of prices from different regional 
markets to their equilibrium.  In this chapter, we use the third indicator as a proxy of the 
degree of market integration since it gathers the dynamic aspects of the relationships 
between cities (Ejrnaes and Persson (2000)). 
The second step in the analysis is oriented to identify the factors that explain the 
degree of market integration.  It is worth to note that the research work that has been 
done on this topic is scarce. Goletti, et al. (1995) have developed one of these studies, 
they sustain that the degree of market integration is a result of the trade action itself as 
well as the operational environment, which is determined by the availability of 
transportation and telecommunication infrastructure and by the policies that affect the 
price transmission mechanism. Using a regression that links a market integration 
indicator with infrastructure variables, these authors find that for the rice market in 
Bangladesh, the main factors that determine the market integration were the 
transportation (mainly paved roads) and telecommunication infrastructure, distance 
between localities and price variability. Nevertheless, most of research on this issue does 
not come across the identification of structural determinants of the degree of market 
integration in presence of arbitrage costs, restraining their attention to the analysis of 
market integration. 
In contrast with previous studies, the contribution of this chapter is that it tries to 
explain the degree of spatial market integration in presence of arbitrage costs by the 
existence of public assets in the cities under analysis, not only emphasizing on the 
transportation infrastructure as a determinant of integration between markets, but also   9
taking into account other factors such as electrical energy and telecommunication 
infrastructure and the presence of public works. Furthermore, this study takes into 
account other determinants such as the existence of wholesaler commercialization 
centers in the localities under study and the presence of geographical differences 
between regions, by using regression analysis with the purpose of evaluating the factors 
that may influence in the determination of market integration.  Once we have discussed 
the main contributions in the specialized literature, we proceed to present the model used 
in this research. 
 
3.  A simple threshold cointegration model 
3.1   The model 
In this section, we present a dynamic model that incorporates the existence of 
transaction costs and the reversion of trade flows patterns in the analysis of the series of 
agricultural products prices.  In addition, it allows us to make inference about the speed 
of prices adjustment to their equilibrium levels and other parameters of interest by using 
the threshold cointegration method. 
The model
8 explains the behavior of price differentials between two cities where 
an agricultural product is traded.  Let X1t be the logarithm of the output in the city 1 
whose price in logarithms is p1t.  The first part of the model consists on specifying the 
demand function that, for simplicity, is assumed to be linear and symmetric for both 
cities: 
                         t t t u X n a p 1 1 1 1 1 + − =                                                  (4) 
In this equation, a1 and n1>0 (price elasticity of demand) are parameters and u1t is 
a random variable that represents the demand shocks.  The equation establishes that an 
increase in X1t in the first city leads to a decrease in its market price.  u1t is probably non-
stationary in the long run, and this may be a sign of the existence of permanent demand 
shocks.  Moreover, if the price series is daily, it would be sensible to think that u1t will  
show serial autocorrelation.  Following Ejrnaes and Persson (2000), the spatial arbitrage 
condition is given by: 
                             
12
2 1 t At t C p p + ≥                                                       (5) 
From equation (5) we may infer that city 1 will import from city 2 if the autarkic 
price in city 2 plus the arbitrage costs are less than or equal to the price in city 1.  If the 
price p1t differs from the autarkic price (p1At), profits from trade would be available as 
long as such profits exceed the arbitrage costs.  In both directions, the product 
importation (exportation) will imply that:  t t F X ∆ = ∆ 1  , where  t F ∆  is the product inflow 
from city 2 to city 1 (or vice versa, when the analyzed case is city 2).  To complete the 
model it is necessary to define a specification for the arbitrage costs.  Here, to simplify, 
following Prakash and Taylor (1997), we describe a logarithmic symmetric costs 
function by using a quadratic specification: 
              
2
12
12 | | 2 1 | | t t t F b F c d C ∆ + ∆ + =                                                (6) 
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Thus, there is efficient arbitrage when the marginal income (MgI) is equal to the 
marginal cost (MgC).  If  ) ( 1 2 1 1 − − − = t t p p MgI  and t F b c MgC ∆ + = 12 , making equal 
both expressions we have that: 
                          t t t F b C p p ∆ + = − − − 12 1 2 1 1 ) (                                                         (7) 
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1 σ N  is white noise.  Replacing the previous result in (8) 
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Since a similar expression is obtained for t p2 ∆ , we may find a simple error 
correction model with symmetric thresholds (TVECM).  This model takes into account 
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In (10) we have that b n n / ) ( 2 1 + = α  , which is the parameter of adjustment to an 
equilibrium band determined by certain thresholds, which are the symmetric marginal 
costs of arbitrage in each direction of trade, constant and equal c12.  This parameter of 
adjustment depends on the price elasticities of the demand functions of both cities.  The 
prices of the agricultural product in the cities 1 and 2 (expressed in logarithms) are 
assumed to be non-stationary, being  1 2 1 1 1 − − − − = t t t p p m  the price differential.  The   11
estimated value of α  is expected to be within the interval ]0,-1]
9.  Finally,  t t t e e 2 1 − = ε ~ 
) , 0 (
2 σ N . 
A useful characteristic of this model is that it does not require empirical 
information about trade flows or transaction costs for its estimation.  Moreover, from this 
specification we can distinguish three trade regimes: 12 c mt〉 ,  12 c mt − 〈  and, finally, 
12 | | c mt ≤ . The last regime corresponds to the condition for efficient spatial arbitrage, 
which is consistent with two situations: the first one, where trade occurs and arbitrage is 
efficient, and the other one, where no profitable trade occurs.  In the first (second) 
regime, intermediaries do not exploit profitable trade opportunities by exchanging the 
agricultural product from 1 to 2 (2 to 1).  If arbitrage takes place with lags, under these 
conditions, mt will be pushed so as to adjust to the equilibrium band [-c12, c12].  This 
adjustment process will occur outside the band only until the threshold values of the 
band are reached.   
The Threshold Error Correction Model (TECM), presented above, allows us to 
model the type of behavior described for mt. Thus, if the price margin between cities is 
situated within the equilibrium band -that is when arbitrage is efficient- the error 
correction mechanism will not work, so the margin will not show a central trend but 
follow a random walk
10.  Otherwise, when the margin is outside the band, arbitrage takes 
place and the error correction mechanism will work adjusting the price differential 
towards the thresholds
11.  To build a more sophisticated version of this model that allows 
incorporating information about observable commercialization costs, we assume that 
arbitrage costs vary according to the innovations in fuel prices. This is convenient to 
control for the existence of transportation costs within the total arbitrage cost (which 
includes information costs, negotiation costs, etc).  Moreover, we incorporate in first 
place a set of dummy variables to control for the inherent seasonality of high frequency 
price series (for example, daily prices), in second place a set of lags  t m ∆  to control for 
the possible presence of serial autocorrelation in the data and, finally, a lag of the price 
differential in the equation that describes the behavior inside the band in order to test the 
existence of non-stationary behavior within this regime
12.  With these innovations, the 
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Where β is the weight for the price of fuel (c12t), di are the parameters of the 
seasonal dummies,  i γ  are the coefficients of the lags of  t m ∆ .  λ  should be statistically 
equal to zero if, within the band defined by the thresholds, the price differential shows a 
                                                 
9 α  will be zero if C12 is sufficiently large so as to prevent arbitrage from occurring, if it is never possible 
to observe profitable arbitrage opportunities, or if the markets are not integrated because of the existence 
of market failures or high transportation costs.  See Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999). 
10 Notice that, even when mt is globally stationary, locally, within the band, it will show a non-stationary 
behavior.  See Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999). 
11 The magnitude of the adjustment will be a percentage of the price margin deviation in each period. 
12 This last innovation in the basic model has been suggested by Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999).   12
non-stationary behavior
13.  Finally, φ  is the transaction cost (which would represent the 
negotiation, information, enforcement costs, etc). 
If the price of fuel is non-stationary, then as a first step it will be necessary to 
evaluate whether prices and this type of costs are cointegrated or not.  If the existence of 
cointegration cannot be rejected, it will be possible to estimate the model without 
ambiguities.  The estimation of φ  (the implicit transaction cost) provides additional 
information about market performance.  In particular, if φ  is positive, there is evidence 
of market imperfections (entry barriers, incomplete information, etc)
14. 
Under this specification of the model, within the equilibrium band, there is no 
dynamic relationship between the price variations in each market.  Nevertheless, outside 
the band the error correction mechanism (controlling the seasonal factors and 
autocorrelated data) may be observed.  The variations in one market are transmitted with 
errors to the other, but an adjustment process that will correct such errors in each period 
will work.  Similarly to other conventional error correction models used in previous 
studies of market integration, a natural measure of spatial integration -for given 
transaction costs and an existing long run equilibrium band- is the speed of 
adjustmentα : the closer the estimated parameter is to -1, the better the degree of 
integration. 
The model presented here implicitly shows a clear relation between cointegration 
and efficient arbitrage.  If an efficient arbitrage occurs, a non-stationary behavior must 
be observed in the margin t m .  Otherwise, that is only if imperfect arbitrage occurs, it 
will be possible to observe a cointegrating relation between prices and, hence, the 
formulation of an error correction approach will be valid.   
Other useful estimators that may be obtained with this model are: the average 
time that prices take to adjust to the long run equilibrium, the percentage of cases in the 
sample where the efficient arbitrage condition is violated and the percentage of cases 
where the arbitrage condition is satisfied.  These two last indicators are similar to the 
probabilities of a successful and failed arbitrage, which are estimated in the Parity 
Bounds Model. 
In conclusion, the TECM is clearly consistent with the efficient spatial arbitrage 
models: it allows for discontinuities and reversion in trade flows, just as the parity 
bounds model.  However, this model introduces more sensible assumptions about the 
probability distributions and explicitly incorporates dynamic elements by modeling the 
arbitrage process in a nonlinear error correction framework
15, so it results advantageous 
for this research.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
The research will take the Peruvian potato market as case of study, using the 
threshold bivariate cointegration methodology for the analysis.  For the statistical tests 
                                                 
13 It is necessary to use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test or a similar test to test this hypothesis. 
See Chien Lo and Zivot (1999). 
14 However, as Balke and Fomby (1997) sustain, it is not possible to make statistical inference about the φ  
parameter by using the conventional techniques due to the non linearity of the model.  
15 The model just presented is a simple version of a large family of TECM models.  Chien Lo and Zivot 
(1999) as well as Balke and Fomby (1997) present more complicated extensions in terms of more 
complicated lag’s structure, different adjustment speed for each regime, etc.    13
we will use consumer price series of daily frequency, from the following cities:  Lima, 
Huancayo, Arequipa, Puno, Trujillo, Ica, Piura, Huancavelica, Ayacucho and Cusco.   
Moreover, we will use daily data of the price of fuel Diesel 2 as a proxy variable to 
control for transportation costs.  With the purpose of evaluating the dynamics of 
transmission of information between cities at regional level and, from that, the existence 
of threshold relations in prices, we have considered convenient to model these variables 
by using a nonlinear dynamic system (described on section 3.1) in which we explicitly 
incorporate long run relations between the prices of the set of pairs of cities and the 
transaction costs
16.   
In first place, we will describe the characteristics of the Peruvian potato market 
analyzing the production and consumption behavior in order to verify empirically the 
existence of reversions in the regional trade patterns.  These reversions might be 
explained by the threshold relations between prices caused by the transaction costs, as 
this document sustains. Secondly, we will proceed to evaluate whether the prices 
expressed in logarithms present unit roots by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, 
this is important since the cointegration tests can be performed for series that show to be 
non-stationary of order I(1). Afterwards, we will evaluate the existence of long run 
relations between prices of pairs of cities and the price of diesel, using the Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) procedure as a prerequisite for the estimation of the price threshold 
model.   
Once the existence of cointegration between the series under analysis is verified, 
we estimate the threshold error correction model described by the expression (11).  From 
the estimation of this model, it will be possible to find the speed of adjustment towards 
the equilibrium, the transaction costs that constitute the equilibrium band thresholds of 
the prices, and the probabilities of successful and failed arbitrage at regional level, 
controlling for seasonality and autocorrelation of the daily frequency price series.  Then 
we will perform the likelihood ratio tests in order to evaluate the significance of the 
estimated transaction costs by using the Prakash and Taylor (1997) methodology. 
Finally, as a new feature of this document, we will explore whether there exists a 
relationship between (i) the degree of market integration of each city and the transaction 
costs and (ii) the assets endowments and public services infrastructure available in the 
cities (for example: roads, telecommunication services, electrical infrastructure, etc) by 
using regression techniques.  The results of applying this methodology to the Peruvian 
potato market case are described in the next section. 
 
4.  Study of the Peruvian potato market 
4.1  Brief description of the characteristics of the market under study 
The potato market presents very special features since it has the largest cropping 
area
17, and hence the largest production, in Peru.  The production of potato in Peru in the 
last years has been from 2.6 to 3.2 thousands of metric tons a year, proceeding from 234 
to 285 thousand annually harvested hectares (Ministry of Agriculture of Peru, 2002).  
                                                 
16 This type of approach presents a statistical model of the behavior of the variables rather than an 
economic structural model.  The advantage of this type of approach is that it allows approaching the data 
without establishing a priori constraints. 
17 In 2001 according to FAO, Peru was the eleventh country with the biggest cropping area allocated to 
potato production, out of 152 countries (See     
http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?version=ext&hasbulk=0&subset=agriculture)   14
The magnitude of the crop, which is harvested in all the departments of the Sierra as 
well as in several departments of the Costa, make that any deviation on its production or 
prices (caused by weather, harvested area, purchasing power, passability of roads, 
changes on returns, concentration of crops) constantly affects the market conditions for 
its commercialization and distribution.   
In reference to the spatial distribution of the potato production in Peru, 9 out of 
the 19 departments that produce potato account for 75% of the total production, whereas 
3 out of them contribute with 35%.  Almost all of the potato production in Peru comes 
from the Mountains Region characterized by sharp seasonality.  Hence, from 60% to 
70% of the annual potato production is harvested between the months of March and 
June, and around 55% is harvested from April to June. 
As mentioned before, the potato production is sharply affected by seasonality.  
This is so because the weather conditions determine the timing for the sowing season 
and consequently the harvest season. The variety of the climatic formations in this 
country makes it possible to sow during the whole year, although in different 
proportions.  In some cases, sowing responds to programs for harvesting in low 
production seasons, so as to supply markets whose demand for fresh potato persists the 
entire year.  
Because of its high concentration of population, good purchasing power, distance 
from the production areas and consumption tradition, Lima city is the largest permanent 
consumer market of potato in Peru (more than 1200 metric tons daily in average).  Lima 
city has a wholesale commercialization market (Mercado Mayorista), where most of this 
tuber is consumed or sold to other markets to be commercialized.  This market center 
keeps daily register of incoming production specifying information about origin and 
“varieties” (species) as well as of the wholesale corresponding prices.   
Analyzing this market, it is worthwhile noting that in Peru, a high percentage of 
the potato production is destined to self-consumption and also to local or regional 
consumption. In addition, there exists a wide dispersion of small productive units 
(mainly in the department of Puno).  The most important markets (such as the city of 
Lima, Trujillo, etc.) are supplied by the production shares destined to trade and by the 
variable surplus quantities left by another producers, strongly affected by relative prices.  
Only a small share of the total production is intended for international market. 
 
4.2 The  data 
The previous step required to perform the statistical exercise described in Section 
3, consisted on building an appropriate data base.  In order to do this, we gathered daily 
information about wholesale nominal prices from a data base of daily prices compiled by 
INEI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática) to build the CPI (consumption 
price index).  The period of analysis that was chosen is January 1995 through May 2001.  
Such data base was verified with information obtained from documents published by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). 
The cities selected for the analysis are: Lima, Arequipa, Huancayo, Ica, 
Ayacucho, Piura, Puno, Huancavelica, Trujillo and Cusco.  They were chosen because 
their price series had the least number of missing observations
18, and also because they 
                                                 
18 We used the random imputation method to solve the missing observations problem.  In particular, we 
applied the procedure proposed by King et al. (2001).  This procedure assumes that the data base follows a   15
have a significant share in the regional distribution of production (see Table 1).  With the 
purpose of homogenizing the data, we considered five-day weeks since in the original 
data base there were too many missing observations for the weekends.  We verified that 
excluding these weekend observations did not generate any bias.  The final data base 
contains 1,540 observations for each city. 
 
4.3  Model estimation and test of hypothesis 
Using the data base described in the previous section, we proceeded to estimate 
the TECM presented in Section 3.1 in order to find the transaction costs and the speeds 
of adjustment for a total of 45 city pairs.  Previously, we verified that all the price series 
were non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences.  Moreover, we verified 
that all the pairs of price series in logarithms for the analyzed cities cointegrated with the 
price of fuel, at least at a 10% significance level
19.  Generally, the estimations of the 
cointegration coefficients of prices were close to one, which is consistent with the 
presence of spatial market integration with constant real transaction costs.  Subsequently, 
we estimated the TECM described in (11) from which we were able to estimate the 
transaction costs and the parameters of adjustment towards the equilibrium band.  In 
order to carry out comparisons, we consecutively estimated an (auto regressive) AR (1) 
model in which we assumed there are no discontinuities or reversions in the trade flows.  
The estimation of this last model is useful to compare the goodness of fit of the TECM 
model using adjustment parameters; this coefficient is usually mentioned in studies of 
market integration.  Table 2 shows, in addition to the described estimators, the average 
time that prices take to adjust towards the equilibrium band, the Dickey-Fuller test to 
evaluate the presence of non-stationarity within the equilibrium band (according to the 
description in the expression 7), the joint significance statistical tests of the price margin 
lags and the seasonal dummies, and the weight for the transportation cost.   
The thresholds or transaction costs obtained here are estimators of the distortions 
in potato commercialization. Comparing them with observed transportation cost 
information may become a basis for future research about the efficiency of Peruvian 
agricultural markets. Unfortunately, given the currently available econometric 
techniques, it is not clear how to make statistical inference on these estimators since the 
parameters have a non standard limit distribution which depends on the sample moments 
(see Hansen 1997).  Nevertheless, Chan (1993) and Chan and Tsay (1998) have proved 
that the threshold parameters are superconsistent
20, and that the other parameters of the 
TECM models are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal distribution with the 
typical formulas for the variance-covariance matrices, being independent of the threshold 
parameters. Hence, it is possible to evaluate the significance of the remaining parameters 
of the model using the traditional Wald test because the statistics are asymptotically 
distributed following a Chi-squared function [Chien Lo and Zivot (1999);  Hansen 
2001]. 
Despite it is not possible to make statistical inference about the transaction costs, 
the superconsistency of the thresholds guarantees that, for this research, these estimators 
                                                                                                                                                  
multivariate normal distribution, and generates a set of random simulations from the original data base by 
using a distributed lags approach in order to complete the missing observations.  The post-imputations 
results were consistent with the series data expressed in logarithms and showed to be superior to those 
obtained by the interpolation linear method. 
19 The results of the statistical tests are available upon request. 
20 According to Chan (1993), these parameters converge to T, which is the number of observations.   16
can be treated as the real transaction costs.  Moreover, the existence of a considerable 
dispersion in the estimated costs
21 strengthen the previous argument because, despite it is 
possible that some thresholds show to be non-significant, it is unlikely that all the costs 
result non-significant given the important number of city pairs under study.  Finally, it 
should be noticed that there exist other indirect ways to evaluate the importance of 
transaction costs in the arbitrage relations.  A first alternative way consists on evaluating 
the significance of the adjustment parameter. This is a useful indicator since a coefficient 
statistically equal to zero would lead to reject the existence of a threshold error 
correction mechanism, and consequently, the existence of transaction costs.  A second 
alternative consists on performing a likelihood ratio test to verify whether the proposed 
model with thresholds provides a better fit than alternative specifications without 
thresholds.  In this context, validating the TECM model indirectly implies verifying the 
existence of transaction costs in the arbitrage relations.  Following Prakash and Taylor 
(1997), we perform this test having as null hypothesis that the model specification is 
AR(1) without thresholds.  Given that, as Chien Lo and Zivot (1999) point out, the 
distribution of the statistic is not standard, we used the Montecarlo Simulations method 
to find the critical values and approximate p-values. 
 
                                                 
21 The variation coefficient of the transaction costs presented on Table 3 is 0.412. 
4.3.1 Main  Results 
In Figure 1 we can observe the equilibrium band defined for prices differential in 
the city pair Lima-Huancayo.  The estimation results suggest that the equilibrium band is 
defined by the thresholds 0.205, -0.205.  As suggested by the figure, since prices 
differential is either above or within the band, most of the trade flows would be taking 
place in one direction (Huancayo-Lima), with a transaction cost of 20.5%. 
According to Table 2, it is possible to verify the presence of an adjustment 
mechanism towards the equilibrium band, determined by the transaction costs, for all the 
city pairs under study.  This is so, since the adjustment parameters are significantly 
different from zero.  This result can be interpreted as evidence of intermediaries’ 
prediction failures about prices differences between cities. For example, if an oversupply 
(undersupply) of potato takes place, negative (positive) profits will be obtained as a 
result of arbitrage, but they will tend to disappear as market adjusts to correct the 
disequilibrium. 
In general, the estimated transaction costs are fairly reasonable for the city pairs 
under analysis.  For example, in the case of the pair Ayacucho-Puno, the transaction 
costs are very high (79%), so chances of trade between both cities would be small.  This 
result can be explained by two reasons; first, Puno is a region that consumes by itself its 
potato production, and second, there exists a considerable distance and geographical 
diversity between both cities.  A similar explanation is valid for the pairs Huancavelica-
Puno, Huancayo-Puno and Huancavelica-Cusco. 
On the other hand, there exist intermediate cases such as Piura-Huancavelica, 
Arequipa-Ayacucho, Huancayo-Trujillo, Ayacucho-Trujillo, among others, where the 
transaction costs are not so high and the adjustment parameters indicate a higher 
adjustment speed towards the equilibrium.  In these cases, the integration between 
markets takes place, as Erjnaes and Persson (2001) sustain, through medium cities that   17
are used as linkage for the commercialization and transportation of products.  For 
example, the pair Huancayo-Trujillo is linked through Lima city, whereas the pair Puno-
Huancavelica is integrated through the corridor Huancayo-Lima-Trujillo.  The estimated 
thresholds, in these cases, can be interpreted as the differential transaction costs from one 
pair of markets to a third market, with which they are linked as suppliers or consumers.  
This interpretation is consistent with Ejrnaes and Persson (2000) arguments; these 
authors show that the equilibrium price differential between integrated markets that do 
not trade with each other is lower than the transportation cost between them. 
Moreover, it is worth to emphasize the existence of city pairs where the 
adjustment towards the equilibrium is fast because transaction costs are low and, 
consequently, arbitrage opportunities do not persist for too long (less than 8 days for the 
adjustment towards the equilibrium).  We may quote the cases of Lima-Huancayo, Ica-
Lima, Arequipa-Ica, Huancayo-Huancavelica, Piura-Trujillo, among others.  The 
closeness of the cities, the similarity of geographical conditions and the accessibility to 
paved roads, would facilitate the potato trade, as they do in the case of the pair Lima-
Huancayo.  An additional detail that should be mentioned is that, in general, the city 
pairs located in the Coast present lower transaction costs and higher speed of adjustment 
to the equilibrium, this is a sensible result since this region has better transportation 
facilities, especially in terms of the good condition of the roads. 
Other important result is that, in most of the cases, the TECM model proves to be 
a suitable specification compared to a simple AR (1) model without thresholds.  This is 
so because since, according to Table 3, in many of the market pairs under analysis the 
transaction costs are a significant source of trade distortion, estimating arbitrage relations 
without taking into account such costs would imply a specification mistake. 
 
4.3.2  Identification of the different arbitrage regimes and their consistency with 
the potato consumption in Peru 
In order to identify different arbitrage regimes, we show in Table 4 the 
percentage of cases in which the prices differential between markets falls either within or 
outside the equilibrium band.  As observed in this table, most of the market pairs present 
potential reversion in trade patterns, although the percentage of implicated observations 
is little. 
The market pairs are most frequently situated in the Regime II, where no 
arbitrage opportunities persist: the efficient arbitrage condition is satisfied in more than 
70% of the cases.  Only in few cases, we observe less than 60% of the observations from 
a particular pair of cities within the Regime II (for example, the case of Puno-Cusco, 
Lima-Huancayo).  In other words, even if in some occasions the trade opportunities are 
not completely exploited, most of the markets are often in an efficient arbitrage situation. 
It is possible to conclude that, even though the integration of markets exists in the 
long run, since arbitrage opportunities are present due to rigidities in the process of 
adjustment to the equilibrium, the markets do not prove to be integrated in the short run.  
However, for most market pairs the efficient arbitrage situation is satisfied in more than 
70% of the observations. 
We should mention that without further information about the observed 
transaction costs or about trade flows it is not possible to get robust conclusions either 
about efficiency in arbitrage relations or about reversions in the trade patterns.   
Nevertheless, some information pieces are available for this aim.  Using information   18
from the survey ENAHO – IV quarter 2001 performed by INEI, it is possible to estimate 
the consumption of potato by department for the last three months of the year 2001, in 
order to contrast this estimation with information on potato production so as to evaluate 
the occurrence of reversions in trade patterns.  The results are shown in Table 5. 
Given the large variety of climates and cropping zones in Peru, it is not surprising 
that the same crop is produced in different periods during the year.  This diversity allows 
for the existence of trade opportunities between regions.  As shown in Table 3, potato 
producing departments are “net exporters” in one period of the year but “net importers” 
in other period of the year. Thus, for example, the potato production in Junín exceeds by 
far its departmental consumption during the first six months of the year, whereas during 
the second semester Junín needs to buy potato from other departments to provide for its 
own consumption.  Something similar is observed in Ayacucho, Cuzco, Huancavelica, or 
Ica where it is required to import potato at least during some months of the year.  On the 
other hand, there are departments that always produce more than the output they actually 
consume, such as Arequipa and La Libertad, so they tend to be net exporters most of the 
year, while others, such as Lima and Piura, tend to be net importers during the whole 
year.  With this evidence, it is possible to support the hypothesis of the existence of 
reversions in the trade patterns of the potato market, as it was pointed out from the 
results presented in Table 4. 
Another way to test the existence of different arbitrage regimes as well as the 
reversion in the trade patterns is comparing the behavior of the prices differential with 
respect to the observed transportation costs.  On the basis of information obtained from 
the MTC (Ministry de Transports) about the average freight per ton, it is possible to 
identify the presence of different arbitrage regimes.  For example, as shown in Figure 2 
for the case of the pair Lima-Huancayo
22, it is possible to identify that the trade direction 
goes from Huancayo to Lima between May and September because the prices in Lima 
are higher than the average freight cost.  This result is consistent with the evolution of 
the potato production in the country, which is shown in Table 5.  During these months, 
the central part of the Sierra enters the harvest period for this tuber, known as the main 
cropping season, having Lima city as its main destination market.  The opportunities to 
trade from Huancayo towards Lima city increase in this period. However, during 
September and December when the complementary cropping season takes place, the 
production of the central part of the Mountains (Sierra Central) decreases, so the demand 
from Lima is satisfied by the department of Huanuco.  In this period of the year, trade 
opportunities for Huancayo decrease because its prices are not competitive anymore 
when facing Lima city’s market. Thus, the presence of reversion in the potato trade 
patterns between these cities becomes apparent, and as this study verifies the direction of 
trade is not unidirectional over the year.    
 
4.4  Determinants of market integration in potato market 
After estimating the transaction costs and the adjustment parameters as indicators 
of trade distortion and markets speed of convergence to equilibrium, respectively, we 
proceed to identify what are the determinants of these variables by evaluating the 
availability of public assets in the cities under analysis, such as telecommunications and 
local media infrastructure, electrical energy infrastructure, roads, among others.  The 
identification of the determinants of the transaction costs existing between agricultural 
                                                 
22 The data and graphics for the other city pairs are available upon request.   19
markets located in different cities will help to the implementation of policies oriented to 
improve efficiency and competitiveness in such markets. 
The information used in these sections was obtained from the National 
Infrastructure Survey performed by INEI, this survey collected district data about 
different types of infrastructure: roads, electricity, telephones, schools, health centers, 
local market infrastructure, radio and television stations, among others, during the period 
1997 to 1999. 
Taking the transaction costs and the adjustment parameters as dependent 
variables, two types of regressions are estimated in this section.  In the first place, we 
used the stepwise method for linear regressions to evaluate the relationship between 
transaction costs and public assets.  As a starting point, we estimated a first equation to 
analyze the relationship between the estimated costs and the infrastructure endowment in 
1999 for the districts that constitute the province where the cities under analysis are 
located.  The independent variables in this regression are: 1) the percentage of districts of 
the province where the first (second) city of the pair under analysis is located that have 
access to more than 13 hours of electrical energy - Energy 1 and Energy 2 -, 2) the 
percentage of paved roads in the department where the first (second) city is located - 
Road 1 and Road 2 -, 3) the percentage of districts from the province where the first 
(second) city is located that has local radio stations - Radio 1 and Radio 2 -, 4) the 
percentage of telephone installations concentrated in the province where the first 
(second) city is located - Telecom 1 and Telecom 2 -, 5) the percentage of districts in the 
province where the first (second) city is located that has permanent market infrastructure 
- Market 1 and Market 2 -, and 6) the percentage of districts in the province where the 
first (second) city is located that has local fairs (Fair 1 and Fair 2). 
The results for the Model 1 are shown in Table 6.  It is possible to observe that 
there exists a negative relation (that is, estimated coefficients are negative and 
significant) between transaction costs (the dependent variable) and access to road 
infrastructure, electric infrastructure, and telecommunication means.  On the other hand, 
given their respective coefficients are not significant, we would expect that accessing to 
local fairs and permanent market infrastructure does not have noticeable effects on 
transaction costs. 
The next step consisted on estimating a truncated regression to evaluate the 
relationship between the markets’ efficiency, which is approximated by the parameter of 
adjustment to the equilibrium. The selection of a truncated model was considered 
suitable since, in theory, the speed of adjustment can be seen as distributed in the interval 
[0,-1], where 0 would indicate that markets do not converge to the equilibrium and -1 
would indicate a perfect adjustment to the equilibrium in presence of exogenous shocks.  
The results for Model 2 are shown in Table 6.  As we can notice, the results are similar 
to those found with Model 1: public assets play a relevant role in the increase of markets 
efficiency by increasing the speed of adjustment to transitory disequilibria. 
Finally, we proceeded to evaluate the relationships between transaction costs and 
adjustment parameters (as dependent variables) and changes in district infrastructure 
endowment (roads, electric energy, radio stations) in the cities under analysis between 
1997 and 1999 (as independent variables).  That is, taking the infrastructure endowment 
in 1997 as initial stock, the estimated regressions included as regressors the changes in 
infrastructure endowment observed between 1997 and 1999. As Table 7 shows, the 
increase or variation in the proportion of roads and electric infrastructure between 1997 
and 1999 are significant variables that contribute to the reduction of transaction costs.    20
We find similar results for the estimation of the Model 2, although in this case the 
increase in the presence of local media is also relevant for the improvement of markets 
efficiency.  However, this model is not conclusive about the effects of an increase of 




This chapter has evaluated how infrastructure endowments may affect the speed 
of adjustment of spatially distributed agricultural markets. To our knowledge, this is the 
first time that the connection between infrastructure endowments and market integration 
has been empirically assessed in a multivariate setting. As we have described in the 
literature review section there is research that has explicitly connected key public 
infrastructure with bivariate measures of integration. However this has not been done yet 
in a multivariate cointegration framework.  
We have shown that an increase in road and electrical energy infrastructure as 
well as a higher access to local media and telecommunication facilities in the cities under 
analysis will lead to reductions on transaction costs as well as on the average time that 
prices take to adjust to their equilibrium levels when facing an exogenous shock. 
Consequently, the degree of spatial integration of potato markets will increase in the long 
run. With these findings we can state that the road and electric infrastructure as well as 
the access to local media and telecommunications facilities are key factors for the 
reduction of transaction costs and the improvement of spatial integration between 
markets. Apparently, the public provision of such public services is crucial for 
generating conditions that improve the efficiency of the Peruvian agricultural markets.  
We believe that this analysis can be improved by implementing some adjustments 
to the methodology proposed here, and thus remains an area for future research. First, we 
recognize that the regression equations proposed in this chapter are in some extent ad 
hoc  and could be replaced in future research by equations derived from supply and 
demand equilibrium. Further, complementarities between different types of infrastructure 
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La Libertad 318825 10.07%
Total national 1925735 60.84%
Source: Own estimates
Table 1  Regional distribution of potato production 
in Peru   2001
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of  equilibrium 
value)
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band
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observable 
transaction cost









Average period of 
adjustment (90% of  
equilibrium value)
Lima - Huancayo 0.205  -0.256 *** 7.802 -7.524   0.076 * 146.836 *** 142.417 *** 2  -0.173 *** 12.123
Lima - Piura 0.545  -0.191 *** 10.839 -2.586  -0.278 * 18.171 *  21.612 *** 6  -0.058 *** 38.639
Lima - Arequipa 0.239  -0.179 *** 11.684 -2.956    -0.154 *** 18.277 *  27.232 *** 4  -0.093 *** 23.509
Lima - Trujillo 0.296  -0.637 *** 2.275 -6.086 0.057   21.531 ***  65.793 *** 2  -0.103 *** 21.001
Ica - Lima 0.111    -0.512 *** 3.212 -1.912     -0.102 ***  47.138 *** 218.138 *** 5  -0.174  ** 12.024
Lima - Ayacucho 0.204  -0.225 *** 9.033 -5.569     -0.101 *** 45.385 *** 21.971 *** 8  -0.081 *** 27.359
Lima - Huancavelica 0.526  -0.354 *** 5.273 -6.549 -0.123 37.003 *** 8.908 ** 2  -0.078 *** 28.849
Lima - Cusco 0.314  -0.084 *** 26.189 -1.263 -0.122 8.576  13.367 *** 2  -0.034 *** 66.141
Huancayo -  Huancavelica 0.245  -0.247 *** 8.116 -1.998 -0.098 19.680 *** 32.075 *** 6  -0.099 *** 21.944
Ayacucho - Huancayo 0.314   -0.229 *** 8.82 -6.22 -0.098 36.159 *** 70.518 *** 4  -0.096 *** 22.79
Huancayo - Cusco 0.414  -0.165 *** 12.804 0.512 -0.121 28.247 *** 12.791 *** 3  -0.048 *** 46.72
Huancayo - Ica 0.282  -0.277 *** 7.092 -7.932 0.028 64.405 *** 65.311 *** 2  -0.167 *** 12.578
Huancayo - Trujillo 0.404  -0.357 *** 5.208 -6.098 0.005 25.119 *** 137.046 *** 2  -0.107 *** 20.316
Piura - Trujillo 0.325  -0.239 *** 8.408 -3.437 0.009 30.925 *** 22.437 *** 2  -0.090 *** 24.388
Piura - Ica 0.413    -0.187 *** 11.099 -1.943  -0.213 ** 17.437 * 79.659 *** 2    -0.075 *** 29.587
Arequipa - Piura 0.567    -0.196 *** 10.534 -2.204  -0.486 *** 85.406 *** 42.924 *** 2    -0.069 *** 32.044
Piura - Huancayo 0.453  -0.067 *** 32.961 -1.467 -0.403 17.520 *** 52.884 *** 2    -0.078 *** 28.377
Piura - Huancavelica 0.657  -0.256 *** 7.791 -5.762 -0.131 39.642 *** 21.279 *** 2  -0.1 *** 21.797
Piura - Ayacucho 0.576  -0.102 *** 21.364 -3.358 0.243 25.418 *** 222.204 *** 2  -0.064 *** 35.055
Arequipa - Ayacucho 0.562  -0.123 *** 17.711 -4.498 -0.056  45.522 *** 337.76 *** 3  -0.055 *** 40.859
Arequipa - Puno 0.396  -0.071 *** 31.511 -0.902  -0.669 *** 22.866 *** 16.529 *** 3  -0.037 *** 61.769
Arequipa - Trujillo 0.442  -0.739 *** 1.716 -6.309  -0.096 * 25.954 *** 137.777 *** 3  -0.086 *** 25.549
Arequipa - Ica 0.232    -0.205 *** 10.047 -1.009  -0.359 *** 60.79 ***  567.306 *** 3   -0.119  *** 18.035
Continued ...
Table 2 Transaction costs and speed of adjustment to the equilbrium of the Peruvian potato market
Threshold Error Correction Model
Market pairs
AR (1) Model without thresholds
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Average period of 
adjustment (90% of  
equilibrium value)
Huancayo - Arequipa 0.553  -0.106 * 20.517 -7.262 0.046 60.202 *** 31.669 *** 2  -0.107 *** 20.338
Huancavelica - Arequipa 0.819  -0.373 ** 4.93 -5.794  -0.257 *** 31.789 *** 49.504 *** 2   -0.065  *** 34.121
Puno - Trujillo 0.516  -0.261 *** 7.618 -2.246 -0.05 18.045 * 73.343 *** 2  -0.055 *** 40.436
Ayacucho - Puno 0.798  -0.456 *** 3.782 -4.644 0.566 35.863 *** 38.901 2   -0.031 *** 74.013
Puno - Ica 0.744  -0.199 *** 10.369 -0.856  -0.33 ** 31.579 *** 202.342 *** 1  -0.039 *** 57.979
Huancayo - Puno 0.942  -0.267 *** 7.424 -5.958 -0.066 51.927 *** 15.786 *** 2  -0.039 *** 56.668
Huancavelica - Puno  0.769  -0.235 *** 8.614 -4.843 -0.121 42.328 *** 21.147 *** 2  -0.046 *** 49.314
Huancavelica - Trujillo 0.368  -0.461 *** 3.72 -6.987 0.127 * 32.890 *** 115.140 *** 2  -0.087 *** 25.429
Huancavelica - Cusco 0.714  -0.480 *** 3.519 -4.886  -0.222 ** 2.026 25.521 *** 2  -0.056 *** 39.976
Trujillo - Ica 0.199  -0.197 *** 10.465 -5.54 -0.037 41.169 *** 32.525 *** 2  -0.104 *** 20.934
Trujillo - Cusco 0.68  -0.773 *** 1.554 -4.305 -0.033 11.04 104.812 *** 2  -0.045 *** 50.491
Ayacucho - Trujillo 0.557  -0.344 ** 5.468 -5.449 0.135 25.523 *** 165.457 *** 2  -0.056 *** 40.194
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 0.298  -0.126 *** 17.047 -0.333  -0.236 *** 60.811 *** 47.033 *** 2  -0.089 *** 24.695
Huancavelica - Ica 0.377  -0.219 *** 9.303 -5.179 -0.053 40.329 *** 63.33 *** 2  -0.083 *** 26.448
Lima - Puno 0.343  -0.054 *** 41.458 -0.287 -0.099 17.979 * 9.603 *** 2  -0.031 *** 73.818
Piura - Puno 0.433  -0.135 *** 15.822 -2.484  -0.259 *** 18.176 * 13.873 *** 2  -0.069 *** 32.344
Puno - Cusco 0.371  -0.118 *** 18.379 -2.516 0.019 16.959 * 7.493 ** 2  -0.047 *** 47.351
Ayacucho - Ica 0.421  -0.114 *** 19.007 -5.589 -0.027 48.006 *** 42.651 *** 2  -0.065 *** 34.001
Cusco - Ayacucho 0.483  -0.107 *** 20.297 -4.605 -0.029 12.346 84.999 *** 2  -0.049 *** 45.354
Ica - Cusco 0.437  -0.152 ** 14.006 -1.431 -0.057 9.078 69.039 *** 2  -0.041 *** 55.105
Piura - Cusco 0.477  -0.120 *** 17.969 -3.779  -0.162 * 47.089 *** 69.399 *** 2  -0.069 *** 31.861
Cusco - Arequipa 0.415  -0.138 *** 15.56 -1.138 -0.064 26.068 *** 28.969 *** 2  -0.047 *** 47.986
*** significative at 1%, ** significative at 5%, significative at 10%
Source: own estimates.
Table 2 Transaction costs and speed of adjustment to the equilbrium of the Peruvian potato market
Market pairs
Threshold Error Correction Model AR (1) Model without thresholds  25
Market Pairs Probability
Lima - Huancayo 82.792
** 0.001
Lima - Piura 86.330
** 0.001




Ica - Lima 468.421
** 0.000
Lima  Ayacucho 12.864 0.136
Lima - Huancavelica 52.938
** 0.007
Lima - Cusco 16.819
* 0.096
Huancayo - Huancavelica 24.367
** 0.047
Ayacucho - Huancayo 26.123
** 0.041
Huancayo -- Cusco 12.426 0.140
Huancayo - Ica 8.199 0.208
Huancayo -Trujillo 14.626 0.124
Piura - Trujillo 49.484
** 0.010
Piura - Ica 24.438
** 0.046
Arequipa - Piura 148.204
** 0.000
Huancayo - Piura 36.216
** 0.021
Piura - Huancavelica 36.417
** 0.020
Piura - Ayacucho 3.662 0.295
Arequipa - Ayacucho 127.485
** 0.000
Arequipa - Puno 1450.225
** 0.000
Arequipa - Trujillo 28.841
** 0.033
Huancayo - Arequipa 13.149 0.135
Huancavelica - Arequipa  29.751
** 0.031
Puno - Trujillo 21.579
* 0.064
Ayacucho - Puno 10.212 0.171
Puno - Ica 71.099
** 0.002
Huancayo - Puno 9.514 0.179
Puno - Huancavelica 4.432 0.281
Huancavelica - Trujillo 18.627
* 0.080
Huancavelica - Cusco 11.911 0.150
Trujillo - Ica 55.196
** 0.008
Trujillo - Cusco 6.223 0.249
Ayacucho - Trujillo 18.022
* 0.086
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 102.857
** 0.000
Huancavelica - Ica 42.411
** 0.013
Lima - Puno 21.484
* 0.067
Piura - Puno 116.192
** 0.000
Puno - Cusco 22.199
* 0.059
Ayacucho - Ica 24.746
** 0.040
Cusco - Ayacucho 33.016
** 0.025
Piura - Cusco 53.261
** 0.007
Arequipa - Cusco 52.764
** 0.007
The approximated p-value and the critic values have been found through 
1000 MonteCarlo simulations.
* significative at 10%, ** significative at 5%
Source: Own estimates
 (Ho: AR(1)  vs   H1:  TVEC)
Critic Values: 6.195, 16.531, 23.695 and 49.360 at 25%, 10%, 5% and 1% 
of significance
Table 3 Likelihood ratio test.
Ratio
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Regime I Regime II Regime III
Trade opportunities: 
profit for the first 
city




profit for the second 
city
Lima - Huancayo 0.7% 57.6% 41.7%
Lima - Piura 6.5% 93.3% 0.1%
Lima - Arequipa 12.7% 85.5% 1.9%
Lima - Trujillo 1.8% 87.0% 11.2%
Ica - Lima 10.7% 85.7% 3.5%
Lima - Ayacucho 2.9% 78.2% 18.9%
Lima - Huancavelica 0.0% 96.4% 3.5%
Lima - Cusco 8.4% 65.7% 25.8%
Huancayo - Huancavelica 12.5% 78.6% 9.0%
Ayacucho - Huancayo 11.5% 85.8% 2.7%
Huancayo - Cusco 11.8% 82.3% 5.9%
Huancayo - Ica 20% 79% 1%
Huancayo - Trujillo 9.8% 89.2% 1.0%
Piura - Trujillo 2.1% 62.6% 35.3%
Piura - Ica 1.1% 77.7% 21.2%
Arequipa - Piura 2.9% 95.9% 1.1%
Huancayo - Piura 0.9% 64.2% 34.8%
Piura - Huancavelica 0.0% 88.8% 11.2%
Piura - Ayacucho 0.0% 73.4% 26.6%
Arequipa - Ayacucho 0.0% 80.6% 19.0%
Arequipa - Puno 14.5% 82.5% 2.9%
Arequipa - Trujillo 0.3% 90.9% 8.8%
Arequipa - Ica 1.9% 77.5% 20.6%
Huancayo - Arequipa 10.3% 89.7% 0.0%
Huancavelica - Arequipa 0.6% 99.4% 0.0%
Puno - Trujillo 1% 81% 18%
Puno - Ayacucho 20.6% 79.4% 0.0%
Puno - Ica 1% 94% 5%
Huancayo - Puno 4.5% 95.5% 0.0%
Puno - Huancavelica 4.0% 96.0% 0.0%
Huancavelica - Trujillo 9.9% 88.9% 1.2%
Huancavelica - Cusco 0.13% 99.74% 0.13%
Trujillo - Ica 18.8% 70.1% 11.2%
Trujillo - Cusco 0.7% 97.9% 1.4%
Ayacucho - Trujillo 10.3% 89.0% 0.6%
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 2.6% 82.3% 15.1%
Huancavelica -Ica 9.2% 89.7% 1.0%
Lima - Puno 31.6% 65.3% 3.1%
Piura - Puno 6.5% 86.2% 7.3%
Puno - Cusco 0.5% 47.9% 51.6%
Ayacucho - Puno 18.1% 80.5% 1.5%
Cusco - Ayacucho 0.5% 87.3% 12.1%
Ica - Cusco 5.4% 81.8% 12.8%
Arequipa - Cusco 1.2% 71.0% 27.7%
Source: Own estimates
Table 4 Probabilities of occurrence for the different kinds of arbitrage 





















Arequipa 4464.46 3490.46 5438.46 17569 2531 13172 15417.00 13,105 -1,933 8,708 10,953
Ayacucho 3063.81 1786.30 4341.33 5590 21112 0 12.00 2,526 18,048 -3,064 -3,052
Cusco 4276.50 2864.79 5688.21 4536 46303 235 252.00 260 42,027 -4,041 -4,024
Huancavelica 3472.33 2181.78 4762.87 2480 17723 0 858.00 -992 14,251 -3,472 -2,614
Ica 2533.97 1673.06 3394.87 0 344 30084 7459.00 -2,534 -2,190 27,550 4,925
Junin 9014.24 6541.88 11486.59 31315 48738 6407 3771.00 22,301 39,724 -2,607 -5,243
La Libertad 6106.89 4646.68 7567.09 5758 53663 18779 14191.00 -349 47,556 12,672 8,084
Lima 44875.52 41847.53 47903.51 3022 1112 2500 25404.00 -41,854 -43,764 -42,376 -19,472
Piura 3301.32 2479.18 4123.46 1370 1004 546 437.00 -1,931 -2,297 -2,755 -2,864
Puno 5920.87 4447.51 7394.23 2259 38534 0 0 -3,662 32,613 -5,921 -5,921
Total Analizado 87029.89 82439.67 91620.10 73899.00 231064.00 71,723 67,801 -13,131  144,034 -15,307  -19,229 
Resto del país 34986.92 31222.39 38751.45 83334.00 125073.00 38,516 55,954 48,347 90,086 3,529 20,967
Total Perú 122016.80 116818.60 127215.00 157233.00 356137.00 110,239 123,755 35,216 234,120 -11,778  1,738
Source: Own estimates
















































No. Of observations 45 45
Log - Likelihood 21.725 66.749
Maximum likelihood R2 0.348 0.846
BIC -165.264 -187.917
Dependent Variable Model 1: Estimated Transaction Cost.  Estimated through 
a linear regression. In model 2: Speed of Adjustment.Estimated through 
a censored regression.
In the first model, t - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
In the second model, z - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
** significative at 5%, * significative at 10% 
Source: Own estimates
Coefficients Model 1 Coefficients Model 2
Table 6 Determinant factors in  the reduction of the transaction costs and 
the increase of the speed of adjustment between markets
 





Energy1  (1997) -0.624 0.221
(0.81) (0.32)
Energy2  (1997) 0.745 -1.557 *
(1.45) (1.88)
Roads1  (1997) -0.357
(1.64)
Roads2  (1997) -1.285
** -1.197 **
(3.76) (2.54)
Radio1      (1997) 0.662
* -1.079 **
(1.67) (2.91)
Radio2      (1997) -1.184
** -1.229 **
(2.05) (2.09)
∆ Energy1 (1999 - 1997) -1.165
* 0.479
(1.62) (0.75)
∆ Energy2 (1999 - 1997) 0.962
* 1.439 *
(1.81) (1.84)
∆ Roads1 (1999 -1997) 0.294 -0.582 **
(1.27) (2.62)
∆ Roads2 (1999 -1997) -1.108
** -0.971 **
(2.79) (1.98)
∆ Radio1 (1999 -1997) 0.226 -0.123
(1.29) (0.40)
∆ Radio2  (1999 -1997) 0.229 -0.169 *
(1.00) (1.61)
No. Of observations 45 45
Log - Likelihood 29.041 60.802
Maximum likelihood R2 0.529 0.377
BIC -183.7 -192.131
Dependent Variable Model 1: Estimated Transaction Cost.  Estimated through 
a linear regression. In model 2: Speed of Adjustment.Estimated through 
a censored regression.
In the first model, t - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
In the second model, z - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
** significative at 5%, * significative at 10% 
Source: Own estimates
Table 7  Changes in the provision as factors that decrease the
  transaction costs and increase the speed of adjustment between markets
Coefficients Model 1 Coefficients Model 2
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Aver. Freight Price Differential
 